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I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 22, 1996, Bell Atlantic Corporation
and NYNEX Corporation announced their plans
to form the largest local telephone company in
the United States with 141,000 employees in thirteen states and the District of Columbia, 39 million lines, $53.3 billion in assets, and $3.4 billion
in estimated annual profits.' After enormous efforts by the merging parties and the reviewing
federal agencies-the Antitrust Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ" or 'Justice Department") and the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission")-the two
agencies reached opposite conclusions.
Approximately one year after the Bell Atlantic/
NYNEX merger was announced, the DOJ issued a
two sentence press release stating that it would
not challenge the transaction. 2 Several months
later, after reviewing virtually the same information as the DOJ, the FCC declared that the Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX merger would harm competition and could not proceed absent the imposition
of serious conditions on the merger 3 that the FCC
believed would protect local competition in the
Northeastern United States. 4 In contrast to the
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reaction that followed the Justice Department announcement, the FCC's decision was cheered by
many critics of the DOJ's decision, and was described as the action "where [the] Justice [Depart5
ment] failed to act."

The contrasting decisions of the DOJ and the
FCC regarding the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger
illustrate the confusing and unpredictable nature
of dual agency review of telecommunications
mergers. Despite years of precedent and the
existence of so-called guidelines, telecommunications merger review remains an ad hoc process.
In general, one would think that the antitrust
activities of the FCC and the DOJ do not completely overlap. In many respects, as the agency
responsible for telecommunications policy, the
FCC's antitrust activities are prospective, establishing rules to ensure or strengthen competition in
the nation's telecom markets. By contrast, the
Justice Department's antitrust activities are generally geared toward case-by-case enforcement, reviewing industry conduct or proposed deals for
compliance with the antitrust laws.
But one area where this theoretical difference
breaks down is the shared authority of the FCC
I See FCC Approves $21-Billion Bell Atlantic-NYNEX Merger
With 8 Conditions, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 15, 1997, at 1.
2 United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division
Statement RegardingBell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger (Apr. 24, 1997)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1997/Apri197/173at.htm>.
3

See In the Applications of NYNEX Corp., Transferor,

and Bell Atlantic Corp., Transferee, for Consent to Transfer
Control of NYNEX Corp. and Its Subsidiaries, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985, 19993-94 (1997)
[hereinafter Bell Atlantic/NYNEX].
4 See FCC Approves $21-Billion Bell Atlantic-NYNEX Merger
With 8 Conditions, supra note 1, at 2.
5

Id. at2.
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and the DOJ in reviewing telecommunications
mergers. Unlike the Commission's establishment
of prospective rules governing industry structure
and activities, its review of telecommunications
transactions, like that of the DOJ, involves the
merits of specific, concrete transactions.
While there were significant telecommunications mergers prior to the 1990s, there has been a
significant increase in such mergers since the
mid-1990s, particularly after passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") .6 In
1996, for example, there were more than 100
transactions just involving cable companies, valued at over $16 billion. 7 Recent telecom mergers
not only have been numerous, but of enormous
scale. The following mergers have occurred since
January 1, 1996: Westinghouse Electric Corporation and Infinity Broadcasting Corporation ($3.9
billion),8 Time Warner, Inc. and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. ($7.5 billion), 9 Continental

Cablevision, Inc. and US West, Inc. ($11.8 billion), 1° WorldCom, Inc. and MFS Communica-

tions Co. ($14 billion),' 1 SBC Communications,
Inc. and Pacific Telesis Group, Inc. ("PacTel")
($16.5 billion) ,12 and Bell Atlantic Corporation
and NYNEX Corporation ($25.6 billion). 13
Nineteen Ninety Eight has been similarly active,
with the pending mergers of Alltel and 3600 Communications Co. ($6 billion) , a4 SBC Communications, Inc. and Southern New England Telecommunications Corp. ("SNET") ($4.4 billion) ,' 5
Qwest Communications International, Inc. and
LCI International, Inc. ($4.4 billion), 16 AT&T
Corporation and Teleport Communications
Group, Inc. ("TCG") ($11.3 billion), 17 and one of
the largest telecommunications mergers in U.S.
history, WorldCom, Inc. and MCI Communications Corporation ($37 billion)."'
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The volume and size of these transactions suggest that a critical examination of the dual jurisdiction of the FCC and the DOJ is warranted.
From the perspective of the merging parties, dual
agency review imposes significant delays and costs
both explicitly in terms of out-of-pocket legal and
administrative costs as well as an implicit cost associated with the distraction of the enterprise and
its executives from their business. On the other
hand, dual merger review may be appropriate,
given the volume and enormity of these mergers
and their potential impact on public policy and
consumer welfare.
This article reviews the aspects and consequences of this overlapping agency authority, including its impact on the telecommunications industry and the public, by focusing on FCC/DOJ
review of mergers in the post-1996 Act environment. We recommend that the FCC and the DOJ
reevaluate their relationship and focus on harnessing the benefits of their concurrent authority
while minimizing the transaction costs imposed
on the parties and consumers. Although Congress may be best suited to remedy the problems
associated with this dual jurisdiction, the FCC and
the DOJ can take several steps to improve the telecommunications merger review process.
II.

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF
ISSUES

Telecommunications competition is regulated
by three agencies: the FCC, the Justice Department, and the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC"). Because virtually all telecommunications mergers, particularly those involving common carriers, are within the jurisdiction of the
FCC and the DOJ, we concentrate on that rela-

6 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to be codified
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
7 See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming,
Fourth Annual Report, 13 FCC Rcd. 1034, 1057-58, 1188
(1998).
8 See, e.g., F C.C. approves Merger of Westinghouse and Infinity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1996, at D3.
9 See, e.g., Time Warner, Turner Shareholders Approve $7.5

Telesis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1997, at D4..
13
See, e.g., Mark Landler, Bell Atlantic and Nynex: Match
Made in ... Where?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997, at D1.
14
See, e.g., $6-Billion Alltel Purchase of 360' Said to Bolster 2
Rural Businesses, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 17, 1998, at 1.
15 See, e.g., SBC to Buy Southern New England Telephone in
$4.4-Billion Stock Deal, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 6, 1998, at 1.
16 See, e.g., Mike Mills, LCI To Be Acquired In $4.4 Billion

Billion Merger, CHI.

See, e.g., Seth Schiesel, Qwest Set to Acquire LIC for $4.4
Billion in Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at D2.
18 See, e.g., Seth Schiesel, Shareholders Vote to Approve
Merger of MCI and Worldcom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1998, at D2;
Mark Ribbing, Upstart Wins Battle for MCI, BALT. SUN, Nov. 11,
1997, at IA.

10
TIMES,

TRIB,

Dec. 10, 1996, at 1.

12

17

See, e.g., US West Completes Continental Purchase, L.A.

Nov. 16, 1996, at D2.

See, e.g., WorldCom Acquires MFS,
1997, at B3.
11

WALL ST.

Deal, WASH.

J., Jan. 3,

See, e.g., SBC Completes $16.7 Billion Merger with Pacific

POST,

Mar. 10, 1998, at C1.
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tionship. 19
While the DOJ and the FCC have authority to

review the same mergers and acquisitions, the jurisdictional basis-as well as the scope-of their
authority differs. As an independent regulatory

agency, the FCC has broad authority and expertise regarding telecommunications issues in general. Historically, however, the FCC has been subject to public pressure and strict congressional
oversight. Conversely, as an enforcement agency
operating in the Executive Branch, the DOJ focuses exclusively on competition issues rather
than general public policy goals. Although its
mission is narrower, the DOJ appears less susceptible to direct political pressure in reviewing competition issues than the FCC. These differences
provide the framework for our examination of the
dual jurisdiction of the agencies over telecommunications competition issues.
Statutory Aspects of Agency Authority

A.

tions mergers and acquisitions from two statutory
sources. The first is the Communications Act of
1934 ("Communications Act") ,2) which requires
parties to obtain Commission authorization
before engaging in a number of activities. 2' Typically, a merger involving the transfer of these authorizations or licenses requires Commission approval. Since telecommunications providers
generally have one or more of these authorizations, application to and approval by the Commission must occur before the merger can be con22
summated.
The Communications Act provides the FCC
with a great deal of discretion in reviewing mergers and acquisitions. As both the investigatory
and decisionmaking body, the FCC may base its
decision on evidence that would not be admissible
in court 2 3 and can reject a transaction if the merging parties fail to prove that their deal serves the
public interest.24 The FCC is "entrusted with the
responsibility to determine when and to what extent the public interest would be served by com-

The FCC draws its power over telecommunica19

In general, the FTC is the independent agency that

has authority to review mergers and acquisitions under sections 1 and 6 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 46 (1994). As a
practical matter, the FTC and the DOJ have formalized a
"clearance" process by which the two agencies mutually agree
on which agency will review a particular transaction. See infra
text accompanying notes 116-118. With respect to telecommunications mergers, the Clayton Act, as amended, expressly
excludes mergers and acquisitions between common carriers
from the FTC's authority and gives it to the FCC. See 15
U.S.C. § 21(a) (1994 & Supp. 1 1995). FTC involvement in
telecommunications competition is therefore generally restricted to cable and mass media mergers like the Time
Warner/Turner Broadcasting merger. See infra text accompanying note 123. These mergers can be and often are reviewed by the FCC under its authority over the transfer of
radio licenses. See 15 U.S.C. § 21(a).
Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
20
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
21
For example, section 214 of the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. § 214 (1994), controls common carrier authorizations, while section 310 of the same act, 47 U.S.C. § 310
(1994), governs radio licenses, and 47 U.S.C. §§ 34-39 (1994)
covers submarine cable landing licenses.
For example, in the WorldCom/MCI merger,
22
WorldCom sought approval of the transfer of 35 international Section 214 authorizations, several hundred radio
licenses, and 21 cable landing licenses. See In re Applications
of WorldCom, Inc. and Howard A. White, Trustee, for Transfers of Control of MCI Communications Corporation and Request for Special Temporary Authority, Applications and Request for Special Temporary Authority, CC 97-21, (filed Oct. 2,
1997) [hereinafter WorldCom/MCI]; In re The Merger of MCI
Communications Corp. and British Telecommunication plc,
Memorandum and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 15351, 15372 (1997)
("Finally we recognize that, in evaluating proposed mergers

in telecommunications markets that are subject to change
and uncertainty, we will necessarily be making predictions
about future market conditions and the likely success of individual competitors. In making our predictions, however, we
are not bound by the rules of evidence that may apply in judicial conflicts."); see also FCC v. RCA Communications, 346
U.S. 86, 96-97 (1953); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450
U.S. 582, 594-95 (1981).
Section 308 of the Communications Act, for example,
23
requires the Commission to consider the same factors in reviewing a license transfer as in granting a license in the first
place. See 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1994). Those conditions are
listed in Section 308(b) of the Communications Act: "All applications for station licenses, or modifications or renewals
thereof, shall set forth such facts as the Commission by regulation may prescribe as to the citizenship, character, and financial, technical, and other qualifications of the applicant
to operate the station; the ownership and location of the proposed station and of the stations, if any, with which it is proposed to communicate; the frequencies and the power desired to be used; the hours of the day or other periods of
time during which it is proposed to operate the station; the
purposes for which the station is to be used; and such other
information as it may require. The Commission, at any time
after the filing of such original application and during the
term of any such license, may require from an applicant or
licensee further written statements of fact to enable it to determine whether such original application should be granted
or denied or such license revoked. Such application and/or
such statement of fact shall be signed by the applicant and/
or licensee in any manner or form, including by electronic
means, as the Commission may prescribe by regulation." Id.
24
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 310(d) (requiring that the
FCC determine whether the "public interest, convenience
and necessity" will be served by the transfer of control of a
company holding radio licenses). Numerous provisions of
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petition in the industry." 25 Under the public interest test, the FCC considers the competitive
effects of the merger or acquisition as one factor
among several. 26 Other factors include the effects
of the proposed transaction on universal service,
national security, spectrum efficiency, technological innovation, and the diversity of views and content.

27

The second source of the FCC's statutory antitrust authority may come as a surprise to many
practitioners. Under Sections 7 and 11 of the
Clayton Act, the FCC has the authority to disapprove acquisitions of "common carriers engaged
in wire or radio communications or radio transmissions of energy

. . .

where in any line of com-

merce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."2 8
In contrast to the Communications Act, the Clayton Act requires the FCC to proceed through an
administrative complaint proceeding if it seeks to
2
challenge a merger under Section 7. 9
The FCC has discretion as to whether to exercise its Clayton Act authority3" and rarely does so
beyond paying lip service in its orders. Indeed,
we have not found a case in the last forty years
where the Commission proceeded under the Clayton Act. In numerous Commission decisions reviewing communications industry mergers, the
FCC mentions the Clayton Act, but never uses the
the Communications Act authorize or require the FCC to examine competition issues.) See Douglas B. McFadden, Antitrust and Communications: Changes After the Telecornmunications
Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. LJ. 457, 462-63 (1997) (listing 47
U.S.C. §§ 202, 205, 309(a), and 314 as provisions requiring
the Commission to consider competition issues).
25
United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(en banc).
26 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3, at 19987; In re
Applications of Pacific Telesis Group, Transferor, and SBC
Communications, Inc., Transferee, For Consent to Transfer
Control of Pacific Telesis Group and its Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 2624, 2661 (1997)
[hereinafter SBC/PacTel.
27 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3, at 20003 n.67.
28 15 U.S.C. § 21(a), 18 (1994). Indeed, until 1996, the
FCC had the authority to grant limited antitrust immunity to
certain mergers. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, § 601(b), 110 Stat. 56, 143.
29

In such a proceeding, the Commission issues a com-

plaint setting forth the violation of Section 7 and holds a
hearing in which the Attorney General and other persons,
upon good cause shown, may testify. After such hearing, if
the Commission believes that Section 7 has been violated, it
may issue an order requiring the defendant to cease and desist from such violation and to divest itself of the stock or
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Clayton Act as its basis for proceeding. 31
Although the advantages inherent in its Communications Act authority are certainly a factor in
the FCC's infrequent use of Clayton Act authority,
the FCC's exclusive reliance on its Communications Act power is mostly rooted in the belief that
the proper role of competitive forces in the telecommunications industry should be determined
not so much by the letter of the antitrust laws but
' 32
by the "special circumstances of the industry."
As the FCC explained in discussing the relationship between its public interest test and its review
under the antitrust statutes, "[o]ur examination
of a proposed merger under the public interest
standard includes consideration of the competition policies underlying the [antitrust laws]... but
the public interest standard necessarily subsumes
and extends beyond the traditional parameters of
' 33
review under the antitrust laws."

In contrast to the FCC, the Justice Department
generally acts as an enforcement agency rather
than a policy-making body. Accordingly, instead
of the FCC's broad policy-making "public interest" test, the DOJ proceeds against mergers under
the antitrust laws, typically Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The merger review processes of the two
agencies also differ markedly. 34 As noted above,
in reviewing a merger under the Communications
Act, the FCC is the decision maker and generally
relies exclusively on the public record and the
other interest acquired in violation of that Section.
30
United States v. FCC,652 F.2d at 88.
31
See, e.g., SBC/PacTel, supra note 26, at 2631 (where the
FCC held that "[w]e choose not to exercise [our Clayton Act
authority] in this case because we find our jurisdiction under
the Communications Act to be sufficient to address all competitive effects of the proposed transfer-including the issue
of whether the proposed transfer may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.").
32 United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d at 88 (noting that the
Commission is not responsible for enforcing the antitrust
laws); see SBC/PacTel; Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3, at
19988 ("As courts have previously recognized, in evaluating
whether applicants have demonstrated that the transaction is
in the public interest, we consider the transaction in light of
'the trends and needs of the industry' as a whole, the factors
that 'influenced Congress to make special provision for the
particular industry,' and the complexity and rapidity of
change in the industry.") (citing FCC v. RCA, 346 U.S. at 9395, 98).
3" Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3, at 19987.
-44 As noted above, under the Clayton (and Sherman)
Acts, the agency has the burden of proving to a federal district court that the transaction is impermissible and, in proving that case, the agency may not use evidence that would be
inadmissible before a court.
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pleadings as the basis for its decision. By contrast,
the Justice Department, in its merger review, must
conduct a detailed investigation, relying heavily
on staff inquiries and document requests and
must ultimately bring suit in federal court.
Nevertheless, while the inputs into the
processes of the two agencies may differ, the antitrust analysis of the FCC and the DOJ is very similar. Where the two agencies differ in substance is
that the public interest test is somewhat more flexible and forward-looking and takes into account
issues at least arguably beyond antitrust considerations. Thus, for example, under the public interest test, even if a transaction is likely to harm competition in any relevant market, it may
nevertheless be permitted if other factors sufficiently mitigate that harm. 5 If the same conclusion is reached under the Clayton Act analysis, the
approach historically taken by the DOJ would lead
it to challenge the transaction even if it may bring
other public benefits.

36

Similarly, using the pub-

lic interest test, the Commission has imposed certain conditions on a particular merger that, while
not directly flowing from competitive considerations resulting from the merger itself, might
nonetheless be perceived by the Commission to
be required by the greater public interest. 37 That
being said, the DOJ has shown similar creativity in
See United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d at 104.
Public interest benefits of a merger do not ordinarily
rebut anticompetitive facts of a merger. See Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Merger Guidelines, 4 Trad. Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (1992) [hereinafter,
1992 Merger Guidelines]. However, the FTC has indicated
that it is receptive to claims of efficiencies arising from mergers. See Roundtable Conference with Enforcement Officials, 65 ANTIRUST L.J. 929, 947 (1997). As stated by FTC Chairman
Pitofsky, "the Guidelines say it would be unusual or
35
36

rare .

.

. that efficiencies would justify merger to monopoly.

My own view is I don't ever expect efficiencies to justify
merger to monopoly. But if... there is a substantial claim of
efficiency, and it's a close call in the first place .

.

. that's

where we ought to take such claims into account." Id. The
DOJ may also be willing to consider efficiencies in some
cases. Joel Klein recently noted that, "[wihen you see the
kinds of efficiencies that go to marginal costs, that have the
potential for tangible price reduction, in general when we've
seen them, they have been convincing at times; we've seen
evidence that satisfied us with respect to them." Id. at 946.
37 For programming diversity reasons, the FTC required
Time Warner cable outlets to carry all-news cable network in
addition to CNN). See Paul Farhi, Pulling the Plug on Capitol
Hill WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1997, at C1.
38
15 U.S.C. § 16(d)-(e) (1994).
• 9 The level of industry influence is suggested by the fact
that, during the 1996 elections, telecom-related entities were
among the highest donors to political campaigns. See 1996

imposing conditions as part of antitrust consent
decrees permitting a transaction to go forward
under the Clayton Act. And like the FCC's consideration of such mergers under the Communications Act, such consent decrees are effective
and final only if they are in "the public interest."""
B.

Political Aspects of Agency Review

FCC and DOJ decisionmaking is influenced not
only by statutory considerations but also by political pressure emanating from many sources. This
pressure tends to have substantial influence on
the level of scrutiny directed at particular mergers.
Generally speaking, as an independent policymaking agency, the FCC faces substantial political pressure that tends to influence decisionmaking in all areas under the FCC's jurisdiction, not
just merger review. This factor is most prevalent
during the FCC rulemaking process, where political pressure is brought to bear on the Commission through letters and inquiries from Congress,
as well as through exercise of Congress' oversight
authority over the FCC. 39 The practical result of
this politicization is that the Commission is buffeted by competing, powerful forces on virtually
4
every important decision it makes. 0

Elections Cost More Than $2 Billion; Telecom Gifts Ranked High,
WASH. TELECOMM. WK., Dec. 5, 1997, at 10.
40
One example of this phenomenon is the tribulations
associated with the Universal Service Fund ("Fumd"), a mechanism designed in part to subsidize telecommunications development for schools, libraries, and rural health care facilities. As of this writing, the FCC has not required Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs") to contribute to the Fund because
they are not considered "telecommunications carriers" tinder
the Communications Act. Senate Appropriations Committee
Chairman Ted Stevens (R-Ark.), representing a rural constituency, opposes the Commission's position on this issue.
Consequently, he inserted a requirement into the Commission's 1998 budget authorization directing the FCC to prepare a report on the scope of Universal Service, presumably
for the purpose of encouraging the FCC to revisit this issue
and require 1SPs to contribute to the Fund. See Numerous Senators Expected to Sign Letter Disparaging USE Plan, WASI i.
TELECOM WK., Dec. 5, 1997, at 1.
However, there are others who oppose forcing ISPs to contribute to universal service. While Senator Stevens has been
conducting his campaign, a number of other Senators sent a
letter to FCC Chairman William Kennard criticizing the proposed expansion of universal service. Jd. The issue of ISP
contributions to the Universal Service Fund has now been reduced to a political football, where opposing Members of
Congress are attempting to influence the FCC against the
backdrop of massive public hostility towards assessing fees on
ISPs. Id. The Commission was to prepare its report on Uni-
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In contrast, as a law enforcement agency, the
DOJ has historically been less susceptible to direct
political pressure on particular mergers than the
FCC. 4' Such political pressure is regarded as "un42
seemly" when directed at particular mergers.
Instead, the DOJ's antitrust enforcement tends to
be driven by general antitrust philosophies of the
President and personalities within the DOJ, as
suggested by the shift from lax antitrust enforcement under Reagan to a more aggressive antitrust

William Kennard and DOJ Antitrust Division
Chief Joel Klein urging "vigorous review" of all
proposed telecom mergers. 45 Referring to the
proposed MCI/WorldCom merger, the letter advised both agencies to "closely scrutinize the final
proposal, to ensure that consumers continue to
benefit from competition in long distance and
other communications markets" because "highly
leveraged acquisitions could result in diminished
competition in local markets and higher rates for

approach under Clinton. 43 Thus, as described by

local phone service." 46

Senator Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.) during Congress'
consideration of the 1996 Act, the FCC is "vulner-

"Klein, in particular, is being closely watched by
the antitrust subcommittee leadership.., because
he allowed the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger to go

able to political pressure ...
a lot more vulnera44
ble than the Department of justice.."

Reports indicate

'4
forward virtually unscathed."

that

7

Nevertheless, within the merger context, both
agencies have been finding lately that they are
targets of intensified political pressure. This pressure is rooted primarily in a growing Congressional perception that anti-competitive mergers
are passing muster at the agencies without the imposition of adequate protections for consumers.
These concerns rose to the surface recently when
the leadership of the Senate Judiciary's antitrust
subcommittee sent a letter to both FCC Chairman

MCI/WorldCom has not been the only merger
to attract scrutiny on Capitol Hill. Recently, Congressman Ed Markey (D-Mass.), when commenting on the proposed SBC/SNET merger, stated
that both the FCC and the DOJ should act aggressively during the review process, and in particular,
the DOJ should "use every legal means at its disposal" to block the merger. 48 Given this pressure,
agency scrutiny of upcoming mergers is bound to

versal Service based on mutually exclusive messages from
Congress-a no-win situation for the Commission. Id. On
April 10, 1998, the Commission issued its report, declining to
impose universal service charges on ISPs, but expressing willingness to consider - on a case by case basis - imposing
charges on providers of Internet telephony. See Report to
Congress, In the Matter of Federal-StateJoint Board on Universal
Service, CC Docket No. 96-45, FCC 98-67, at para. 83 (April
10, 1998).
Another instance of the political element to FCC action
concerns proposals to provide free or substantially reduced
charge advertising for politicians. During his 1998 State of
the Union address, President Clinton suggested that the FCC
explore free advertising as a method of reducing the influence of political donations on campaigns. Chairman Kennard, apparently interpreting this remark as a go-ahead signal from the President that would provide him with political
cover, came out in support of free advertising. When opponents learned the Chairman's position, however, a political
firestorm ensued. The controversy was capped by a phone
conversation in which House Telecommunications Subcommittee Chairman Billy Tauzin (R-La.) informed Chairman
Kennard that, should he not change his position on free advertising, he was in danger of having "the worst start ever of
any FCC commissioner." Chris McConnell, Battle Lines Form
Over Free Airtime, BROAD. & CABLE, Feb. 2, 1998, at 6.
41
This is not to say that the DQJ's enforcement priorities
are not affected by political pressure. For example, one can
compare today's heightened level of antitrust review against
the level of review during the Reagan administration. Nevertheless, the DOJ is more removed than the FCC from Congressional influence. For example, the different levels of
congressional oversight were a key factor in Congress' deci-

sion to allocate oversight of the regional holding companies
("RHCs") entrance into in-region long-distance service to the
FCC instead of the DOJ, the agency that had overseen the
Modified Final Judgment since 1982. During the debate on
the 1996 Act, then-FCC Chairman Reed Hundt described the
choice facing Congress in terms of this oversight authority:
The debate ought to be about where the right place to
put these responsibilities is, considering the separation
of powers. For example, do you want these responsibilities in an independent commission that is subject to congressional oversight? Would you rather have them in
the Executive Branch, where the Department of Justice
has a rather different role, vis-a-vis congressional oversight?
Communications Law Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
Telecomms. and Fin. of the House Comm. On Commerce, 104th
Cong. 274 (1995) (statement of Reed Hundt, Chairman,
FCC).
42 See 139 CONG. REc. S11468 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1993)
(statement of Sen. Simon).
4See Stephen Pearlstein, Applying Brakes to Merger Mania:
Antitrust Law Enjoys a Revival, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1998, at
Cl.
44
141 CONG. REC. S8194 (daily ed.June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kerrey).
45
See Panel's Leaders Urge Intense Study of Merger by Kennard, Klein, WAsi. TELECOM WK., Nov. 14, 1997 at 7.
46 Id.
47
Id.
48
SBC to Buy Southern New England Telephone in $4.4 Billion Stock Deal, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 6, 1998 at 1.
4"
The FCC does have ex parte rules, which generally bar
this sort of pressure in adjudicatory proceedings, including

intensify.

49
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These Congressional pressures may also have
an inter-agency component that is fueled by the
desire of both the DOJ and the FCC to influence
telecommunications policy. This was evident during the debate on the 1996 Act, when the Justice
Department sought review authority over Bell Operating Company ("BOC") entry into in-region inter Local Access and Transport Area ("LATA")
markets. In testimony before Congress, then-DOJ
Antitrust Chief Anne Bingaman unfavorably compared the FCC's oversight of competition in the
cellular telephone market with the DOJ's oversight of the Modified Final Judgment that broke
up AT&T and the BOCs. She then summed up by
stating that "responsibility [for Section 271 review] should be delegated to the Department of
Justice, the agency that has applied that standard
for many years. '50 Nevertheless, Congress gave
this authority to the FCC under Section 271 of the
1996 Act, relegating the DOJ to an influential but
supplementary role by directing the FCC to accord "substantial weight" to the DOJ's comments.

C.

51

How Does this Dual Jurisdiction Play Out in
the Context of Merger and Acquisition
Review?

As noted above, with passage of the 1996 Act,
the pace of telecommunications mergers and acquisitions has increased substantially. Although
the 1996 Act itself made only a single change in
the overlapping authority of the FCC and the
DOJ-the elimination of the FCC's rarely-if-everused ability to immunize common carrier mergers
transfers of FCC licenses and authorizations. On the other
hand, the FCC may, at its discretion, waive the applicability of
its rules to adjudicatory proceedings for particular matters
and has done so with respect to a number of industry merg-

ers.

50 Hearing on Telecommunications Policy Reform Before the
Senate Comm. On Commerce, Science, and Transportation,S. REp.
No. 104-218, 25 (1995) (statement of Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division).
51 Section 271(d) (2) (A) of the 1996 Act, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56, 89 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 271 (d) (2) (A)).
52 Former Section 221 (a) of the Communications Act
read, in relevant part:
If the Commission finds that the proposed consolidation, acquisition, or control will be of advantage to the
persons to whom service is to be rendered and in the
public interest, it shall certify to that effect; and thereupon any Act or Acts by Congress making the proposed
transaction illegal shall not apply.

from antitrust challenge5 2-the increase in mergers and acquisitions generated by the 1996 Act has
increased the focus on the different statutory and
political aspects to the authority of the FCC and
the DOJ. A review of the DOJ and FCC treatment
of these transactions, however, suggests a patch-

work of decisions in which no clear pattern can be
discerned.
Sometimes the DOJ and the FCC take complimentary approaches toward merger review. For
example, in the Fall of 1996, both the DOJ and
the FCC acted on the proposed merger of the Bell
Operating Company local exchange carrier
("LEC") USWest and a large cable provider, Continental Cablevision ("Continental").53 The transaction made USWest one of the largest cable operators in the United States, with more than 16.2
54
million subscribers.
However, the transaction explicitly invoked the
FCC's jurisdiction under the 1996 Act, specifically
targeting the cable/telco anti-buyout rule, under
which LECs and cable companies providing service in each other's service area may not acquire
55
ten percent or more interest in each other.
Therefore, because Continental operated in USWest's telephone service area, the parties were required to seek a waiver from the FCC to allow
them sufficient time to divest the in-region sys56
tems at non-"fire sale" prices.
At the same time, the merger raised additional
competitive considerations because Continental
owned 20 percent of Teleport Communications
Group ("Teleport"), a Competitive Local Exchange Carrier ("CLEC") that competes with USWest in certain cities. 5 7 Therefore, the agencies
47 U.S.C. § 221 (a) (1994), repealed by section 601 of the 1996
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56
(1996).
53 See Continental Cablevision Accepts USWest's $10.8 Billion
Offer, CNNfn (Feb. 27, 1996) <http://cnnfn.com/archive/
news/9602/27/uswest/index.html>.
54 See id.
55

See section 572 of the 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104,

1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56, 119 (1996) (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 572). The cable/telco anti-buyout rule has two
purposes. First, the rule protects potential competition between the cable company and telephone company in providing both cable and telephone service. Second, the rule pre-

vents a BOC from using the cable company's facilities to
avoid the restrictions placed on its provision of in-region interLATA service.
56 In re US West, Inc. and Continental Cablevision, Inc.,
Memorandum and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 13260, 13275-76 (1996).
57 See United States v. USIWest, Inc. & Continental Cablevision, Inc.; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact
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also had to address any harm to competition in
these local exchange markets resulting from the
USWest/Continental merger.
The question of the cable-LEC overlap in certain markets is committed to the FCC's jurisdiction under the Communications Act. 58

At the

same time, the DOJ has discretion under the Clayton Act to address not only that issue but also the
Teleport question.
In October 1996, the FCC permitted the USWest/Continental merger to take place without
the parties first divesting all of Continental's inregion cable systems. Citing the public interest
benefits that would inure to allowing the transaction to proceed, 59 the Commission gave USWest

additional time to divest the in-region systems after the merger. "
Although the FCC never noted the CLEC ownership issue, 6' the DOJ addressed this problem in
its November 1996 consent decree with the parties.62 This decree allowed the merger to proceed
but required the parties to relinquish their interest in Teleport by December 1, 1998.63 The DOJ
noted the in-region cable company issue, but
passed on it because the FCC had already ruled
on the issue. 64 In doing so, the DOJ stated that
Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,703, 58,707 (Nov. 18, 1996). This
issue, committed to FCC jurisdiction under the Communications Act, raises competitive issues under the Clayton Act.
Section 572(d)(6) of the 1996 Act permits the Com58
mission to waive the cable/telco anti-buyout rule under certain conditions, subiject to the approval of the relevant local
franchising authorities. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56, 119 (1996) (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 572(d) (6)).
59
These benefits included that of increasing cable television competition by introducing out-of-region investment by
telephone companies in the cable market and avoiding a
"fire sale" of the in-region systems. In re US West, Inc. and
Continental Cablevision, Inc., Memorandum and Order, 11
FCC Rcd. 13260, 13274-76 (1996).
60
Id. at 13280. On February 27, 1998, the Commission
granted USWest's petition for special relief granting an extension of its ownership of Minnesota cable systems it was to
have sold pursuant to the earlier FCC decision. See In re US
West, Inc. and Continental Cablevision, Inc., Petitionfor Special Relief II FCC Rcd. 13260, 13280 (1996); FCC Allows U S
West To Retain Minn. Cable Systems, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 27,
1998, at 3.
61 It is unclear whether the FCC had authority to address
the Teleport issue under the Communications Act.
62
United States v. US West, Inc. & Continental Cablevision,
Inc., Proposed FinalJudgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,703, 58,707 (1996).
63
Id. at 58,704.
64
Id. at 58,708. It is unclear whether the FCC could
have immunized the deal from the DOJ challenge pursuant
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"[t]he divestiture of the in-region systems by a
date certain, pursuant to the [FCC's] Order, as
amended, is substantially similar to the divestiture
relief the Department [of Justice] would seek in
the event the USWest/Continental transaction
was deemed to violate the Clayton Act, and thus
will prevent any lessening of competition that
might have resulted from the transaction.

' 65

In contrast to the almost cooperative approach
shown in the USWest/Continental Cablevision
transaction, there are times when the DOJ and
the FCC reach completely different conclusions
about a particular telecommunications deal. For
example, the largest telecommunications merger
to date that the FCC has approved and the DOJ
declined to challenge is that of the BOCs Bell Atlantic and NYNEX.

66

In that transaction, the DOJ

and the FCC took completely opposite approaches towards a merger that, to many observers, raised significant antitrust concerns on its
face. As two of the largest providers of local telephone service in adjacent regions of the Eastern
United States, the merger of Bell Atlantic and
NYNEX would place a substantial portion of the
Northeast and Mid Atlantic under a single local
telephone company. 6 7 Moreover, this merger
to its authority under the Communications Act.
65

Id.

See Common CarrierAction-FCC Approves Bell Atlantic/
Nynex Merger Subject to Market-Opening Conditions (Rpt. No. CC
97-43) FCC News, Aug. 14, 1997; Antitrust Division Statement
Regarding Bell Atlantic/Nynex Merger (Apr. 24, 1997) <http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1997/April97/173at.htm> [hereinafter DOJ Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Statement]. The DOJ and the
FCC also approved the $16.7 billion merger between the
BOCs SBC and PacTel. See Antitrust Division Statement Regarding Pacic Telesis/SBC Communications Merger (Nov. 5, 1996)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1996/Nov96/542at.htm>
[hereinafter DOJ SBC/PacTel Statement]; In November 1996,
the DOJ issued a Press Release stating that it had "concluded
that the [SBC/PacTel] merger did not violate the antitrust
laws." Antitrust Division Statement RegardingPacific Telesis/SBC
Communications Merger (Nov. 5, 1996) <http://www.usdoj.
gov/opa/pr/1996/Nov96/542at.htm>. Three months after
the DOJ decision, the FCC approved the merger, emphasizing that it did so not because of any efficiencies that might be
gained from the proposed transfer, "but rather its lack of any
" FCC
significant and foreseeable anticompetitive effects ....
Rejects Key Arguments of Opponents to SBC-Pacific Telecom Merger,
COMM. DAILY, Feb. 10, 1997. Unlike in the Bell Atlantic/
NYNEX Order, the Commission found no likelihood that
either SBC or PacTel would have entered each other's markets if the merger had not taken place. See SBC/PacTel, supra
note 26, at 2636.
67
See Mike Mills, Bell Atlantic, Nynex Hold Talks on Partial
or Complete Merger, WAsiH. Posr, Feb. 8, 1996, at D9.
66

1998]

Serving Two Masters

would eliminate the possibility that either BOC
would compete in the other's market for local service. 68 This last factor was accentuated by Bell Atlantic documents indicating that the company
had plans to compete directly with NYNEX in the
New York City metro area.6 9
Nevertheless, the DOJ decided not to block or
place conditions on the merger, finding no likelihood of adverse competitive impact.71 This result
echoed the DOJ's finding in the SBC/PacTel
merger. 7' The DOJ's decision on the Bell Atlan-

tic/NYNEX merger, however, outraged many in
Congress and contributed to the chilly, if not hostile, reception that then-Acting DOJ Antitrust
Chief Klein received when he ventured to Capitol
Hill for his confirmation hearing. 72 Klein later
defended the DOJ's decision not to challenge the
merger in the following terms:
Based on a year-long analysis of millions of documents
including, significantly, the non-public business plans
of many of the affected players as well as lots of deposition testimony, interviews, expert commentary, and advice, I believed, then, and continue to believe, that the
merger was not anticompetitive. In fact, the evidence
indicated that real efficiencies were likely to result from
the merger some of which have already been realizedand that, over time, those efficiencies
would lead to bet73
ter service in the affected areas.

In contrast to the DOJ's decision not to challenge the merger, the FCC seized upon the Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX merger as an opportunity to outline the contours for its public interest analysis of
future telecommunications mergers.7 4 As then68
See $23-Billion Bell Atlantic-Nynex Merger Draws Praise,
Fire: Part II, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 23, 1996, at 3.
69 See Bob Woods, Bell Atlantic/Nynex Merger Closer to Reality,
Newsbytes News Network, 1997 Westlaw 9491446 (Feb. 27,
1997), <http://www.newsbytes.com/nbcgi-bin/udt/
SHOW.NB.NEW?ID=86838>.
70
See DOJBell Atlantic/NYNEX Statement, supra note 66.
71
See DOJ SBC/PacTel Statement, supra note 66.
72
See Kirk Victor, Reach Out and Crush Someone?, NAT'LJ.,
June 7, 1997, at 1133.
73 Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein, DOJ Antitrust
Division, Address Before the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Distinguished Speakers Series, Making the Transition from Regulation to Competition: Thinking About Merger Policy During the Process of Electric Power Restructuring, Uan. 21,
1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches/1332.htm>.
74 See The TelecommunicationsAct: An Anti-Trust Perspective:
Testimony of Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, FCC,Testimony Before the
Senate Judiciaty Comm., Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights
and Competition, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, Sept. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst file [hereinafter Hundt Testimony].

75

Id.

76

See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 36.
See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3, at 19989.

77

FCC Chairman Reed Hundt stated, "In my opinion, the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX decision is a
landmark ruling-in the order, the FCC describes
in detail its flexible and dynamic public interest
' 75
approach to industry structure.

Although the public interest test under the
Communications Act includes a number of factors in its analysis, the Commission paid only lip
service to factors other than the effect of the
transaction on competition. Instead, applying
traditional antitrust analysis principles, including
the DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines, 76 the Commission examined not only the impact of the merger
on markets as they currently existed, but also evaluated the likely effects of the merger on markets
as they would exist after the local competition
provisions of the 1996 Act are fully implemented.

77

Based on its review of the information provided
by the parties, as well as many of the same documents provided to the DOJ pursuant to the HartScott-Rodino premerger review process, 7s the
Commission found that the merger eliminated
Bell Atlantic as a likely competitor with NYNEX in
the lucrative New York market.7 9 It found that
Bell Atlantic and NYNEX were two of the five
likely most significant market participants that
would compete to provide local exchange and
telecommunications services to residential and
small business customers in the New York area. s0
In the end, the FCC was prepared to block the
78 See id. at 20000. In Bell Atlantic/ATYNEX, the Common
Carrier Bureau ordered the parties to provide them with certain of the Hart-Scott-Rodino ("HSR") documents pursuant
to a protective order. See id. The parties did not contest the
order and the Commission did not review its propriety. The
portion of the Commission's Order discussing the HSR documents was issued under seal as a separate Appendix. See id.
However, pursuant to section 201 of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, the DOJ and the FTC
may not make public any information filed with them "except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding." 15 U.S.C. 18a(h) (1994). No court has
interpreted Section 18a(h). See Lieberman v. F'TC, 771 F.2d
32, 37 n.12 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that state attorneys general seeking HSR documents for use in state antitrust proceedings failed to assert Section 18a(h) as grounds for disclosure). The FTC has construed Section 18a(h) as permitting
disclosure of HSR documents to the public to allow comment
on a proposed consent order. See In re General Motors
Corp., 103 F.T.C. 58, 59 (1984) (order dismissing in part and
denying in part petition for disclosure of certain non-public
information).
79 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3, at 19991.
80
See id.
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merger and permitted it to occur only after Bell
Atlantic and NYNEX agreed to numerous conditions.8 ' These conditions were actually proposed
by the merging parties once it became clear that
the FCC would reject the deal otherwise. 2 The
FCC warned that future BOC mergers would be
83
reviewed under a stricter analysis.
Finally, the FCC and the DOJ in certain cases
have reached essentially the same conclusions regarding the merger and imposed virtually identical conditions upon it. The FCC closely followed
its Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger analysis in its review of the proposed merger (valued at one point
for as much as $24 billion 8 4) between British Telecommunications, plc ("BT"), the dominant carrier in Great Britain, and MCI, the second largest
U.S. long-distance carrier. Although this deal collapsed in the Fall of 1997 following WorldCom's
competing bid for MCI, 85 that collapse came only

after the DOJ consent decree and the FCC order
approving the transaction.8 6
Unlike in the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX deal, both
the DOJ and the FCC refused to allow the BT/
MCI deal to proceed without significant concessions by the merging parties. For its part, the DOJ
essentially ordered an extension and expansion of
the conditions imposed on a previous BT/MCI

87
deal in which BT purchased 20 percent of MCI.

These conditions were intended to prevent BT
from leveraging its market power in the U.K. to
gain an unfair advantage in the U.S. and international markets.
The Justice Department also noted the con81

See id. at 19992-93. See also Hundt Testimony, supra note

74. Then-FCC Chairman Hundt, in testimony before Congress, described the Commission's Bell Atlantic/NYNEX order as setting "forward a public interest analysis in which a
telecommunications industry merger will be approved by the
Commission only if it can be shown to advance the goal of
promoting competition. In my opinion, the Bell AtlanticNYNEX decision is a landmark ruling-in the order, the FCC
describes in detail its flexible and dynamic public interest approach to industry structure." Hundt Testimony, supra note
74.
82 See Leslie Cauley, Bell Atlantic, Nynex Agree to Measures
Aimed at Fostering Rivalry in Northeast, WALL ST. J., July 21,
1997, at B6.

See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3, para. 16.
See Gautam Naik & John J. Keller, BT Cuts Purchase
Pricefor MCI by $5 Billion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A4.
The deal was originally valued at $24 billion, but BT subsequently renegotiated the transaction for the lower price of
$19 billion. See id.
85 See John J. Keller & Steven Lipin, Wedding Bells:
WorldCom, MCI Deal Could Rewrite Script for a New Phone Era,
83
84
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cerns of several potential competitors regarding
the effect of the BT/MCI merger on the availability of backhaul, the transport of traffic from the
head-end of an international cable-to a point of
interconnection with a carrier's domestic facilities
in the U.S. s8 Presently, only a few carriers own
backhaul facilities. The DOJ deferred on this issue to the FCC, however, and stated that it would
merely monitor the "extent and nature of the
problem, if any, raised by the merged entity's control of backhaul facilities in the U.S."89
In its order, the FCC essentially followed the
formula set forth in its Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order. The Commission explained how its public
interest test differed from the review performed
by the DOJ, yet applied essentially the same analysis used by the DOJ in reviewing mergers under
the Clayton and Sherman Acts. 90 Unlike the DOJ,
and as the Commission had done in the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, the FCC analyzed the
merger's effect on two contexts of competitionthe state of telecom competition currently and
the state of competition at some unspecified future date when the local competition provisions
of the 1996 Act are fully implemented. Despite
this difference between its analysis and that of the
Justice Department, the Commission also imposed several conditions on the BT/MCI merger
which largely echoed those of the DOJ. 9 1
The FCC noted the DOJ's concerns regarding
access to U.S. backhaul facilities. 92 Following the
DOJ's decision, MCI informed the Commission
that it would offer its backhaul facilities on a firstNov. 11, 1997, at Al.
86 See In re The Merger of MCI Communications Corp.
and British Telecomms. PLC, 9 Communications Reg. (P&F)
657 (1997) [hereinafter FCC BT-MCI Order]; Proposed Final
WALL ST.J.,

Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Modification, 2
Fed. Reg. 37594 (1997) [hereinafter DOJ BT-MCI Modification]; DOJ Antitrust Division News Release, Justice Department

Files Antitrust Suit and Consent Decree in British Telecom and MCI
Joint Venture and Investment Agreement, 1997 WL 265650 (June
15, 1994).

87 See John R. Wilke, British Telecom Purchase of MCI is
Cleared by Justice Department, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1997, at B4.

88 See Justice Suggests Few Modifications to BT-MCI Decree,
Notes U.K Resale Reforms, COMM. RESALE REP., July 21, 1997.
89 DOJ BT-MCI Modification, supra note 86, at 37599.
90 For example, in both the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX and
the SBC/PacTel decisions, the Commission used the 1992
Merger Guidelines. See SBC/PacTel, supra note 26, at 2632
n.35; Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3, at 20008.
91 See John J. Keller, BT-MCI Merger Reshapes Telecom Industry, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1996, at Bi.
92
Id. para. 295 at 115.
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come, first-served basis to other carriers that
bought capacity on BT/MCI's submarine cable.
The capacity would be sold at essentially the same
price as similar domestic private line circuits. The
FCC decided that this commitment resolved any
concerns about BT/MCI's control of U.S.
backhaul facilities and conditioned its approval of
the merger on BT/MCI's compliance with its
93
promise.
These are but three examples of the many telecommunications mergers reviewed by the DOJ
and the FCC since passage of the 1996 Act. We
next review how the DOJ and FCC's approach in
analyzing these mergers impact industry and consumers.

ability with agency action, the current approach
creates an especially high level of uncertainty,
where it is very difficult to even determine which
agency will act, let alone how that agency will eval95
uate the mergers.

The first factor creating unpredictability is that
agency review appears to be on an ad hoc basis.
This is suggested by FCC and DOJ actions with respect to the BT/MCI, Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, and
USWest/Continental mergers, which follow no
clear pattern and thus provide limited guidance
as precedent. Although these cases may lay out
the rationale for the agency's decisionmaking, the
FCC and the DOJ often reach different if not opposite conclusions regarding the same specific
transactions, and as a result, it is difficult to predict how the agencies will react to a particular
deal. Thus, while there is always some unpredict-

Another factor frustrating attempts to predict
agency actions is the uncertainty surrounding the
continued popularity of antitrust theories at the
FCC. The FCC's current emphasis on traditional
antitrust analysis may be a product of the Hundt
Commission and a reflection of the antitrust background of the Chairman and his close advisors.
At this writing, it is unclear what approach will be
taken by the new Chairman and the three new
Commissioners. Moreover, even if the antitrust
emphasis is retained, it is uncertain whether the
FCC will adapt the antitrust approach to non-common carrier mergers.
Likewise, it is difficult to predict or explain the
DOJ's actions because the DOJ typically declines
to explain why it did not challenge particular
mergers. Moreover, challenges to recent telecom
mergers have typically led to consent decrees,
rather than litigated results, and it is therefore increasingly difficult to determine the contours of
antitrust law involving communications industry
mergers. Because the DOJ rarely, if ever, litigates
telecom mergers there is no recent body of antitrust decisions fleshing out these issues. The
DOJ's decision to pursue consent decrees rather
than aggressively litigate cases is also significant
because consent decrees contain only a modest
level of antitrust justification for the DOJ's actions, since a detailed explanation is unnecessary
because the decree is by the consent of the parties. Indeed, even its own Merger Guidelines do
not bind the Justice Department's analysis and, in
any event, none of those Guidelines addresses the
unique characteristics of the telecommunications
industry.
The result is that, during the most active period
of telecommunications mergers in history, there
is no clear guidance for merging parties. Simply
stated, it should not be so unclear how each

Id. para. 297 at 116.
See Robert Corn-Revere, Mass Media Regulation and the

cast ownership decisions.").
95
This concern led Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt

III.

THE COSTS OF DUAL AGENCY REVIEW:
INCREASED COSTS TO TAXPAYERS,
INDUSTRY, AND CONSUMERS

The current approach for reviewing mergers
raises both substance and procedural concerns.
While there is no doubt that the Commission's
analysis of recent mergers has been thoughtful
and thorough, the review conducted by the DOJ
and the FCC often results in significant costs to
the industry and society, suggesting that an exami94
nation of the benefits is appropriate.
Outcomes Are Unpredictable

A.

93
94

FCC: An Agenda For Reform, Citizens for a Sound Economy

to recommend changing the review process to allow busi-

Foundation (Oct. 20, 1997) <http://www.cse.org/ia65-cseftelecom.htm> (stating that "[t]he FCC should not regulate
matters that are committed to the jurisdiction of other agencies.... The Department of Justice, not the FCC, should be

1997, at 1.

responsible for enforcing antitrust considerations in broad-

nesses to have greater certainty beforehand as to how a particular merger will be viewed. See Hundt Sees Different Role for
FCC, New Way toJudge Telecom Mergers, COMM. TODAY, May 30,
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agency will deal with particular telecom mergers
and there should be some codification of principles governing telecommunications transactions.
B.

There Is Duplication Of Effort

In analyzing whether a particular merger raises
any competitive concerns, the FCC and the DOJ
are performing essentially the same tasks. For example, at the FCC, a large part of the merger conditions contained in orders results from negotiations with the merging parties and as a result, FCC
orders often reflect the consent of the parties. 96
The DOJ duplicates this effort by pursuing a consent decree process similar to the FCC, with the
only difference being that the DOJ consent decree is later reviewed by a court to determine if it
is in the public interest. The bottom line is that at
least one important aspect of what both agencies
97
are doing is the same.
As a result, while it is possible to draw legalistic
distinctions between DOJ and FCC authority,
there often appears to be only minor substantive
differences at the end of the day between Section
7 of the Clayton Act and the Communications Act
"public interest" analysis, with different outcomes
merely reflecting the ad hoc nature of the process.
This leads to increased costs to taxpayers and
companies, while also giving merger opponents
two bites at the apple.
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ments, consume the time of corporate executives
in responding to discovery requests and depositions, and result in significant legal fees. There is
also the cost to the taxpaying public of having two
agencies perform what appears to be identical
tasks.
Dual agency review also creates delay and uncertainty, since the merging companies wait for
both agencies to assess the deal before it may be
consummated, as evidenced by the still-pending
WorldCom/MCI merger application filed on October 2, 1997.98 In addition, Congress' removal of
the FCC's authority to immunize mergers from
antitrust challenge creates the possibility of the
Justice Department challenging a merger previously approved by the FCC. Ultimately, the burden on the public is significant. The question
raised by FCC and the DOJ review is plain-is it
worth the cost?
IV.

THE BENEFITS OF DUAL REVIEW:
WHEN IS DUAL REGULATION NOT
DUPLICATION?

Finally, even if it can be argued that the DOJ
and FCC are serving two different and legitimate
goals rather than duplicating efforts, it is still unclear whether the cost to the public is justified.
The merging parties incur significant expenses in
responding to overlapping requests for information by both agencies. At the FCC, parties must
apply for requisite authority, respond to comments, provide documents, and meet with Commission staff, resulting in significant costs. Similarly, a Justice Department investigation may
require production of millions of pages of docu-

Although the dual regulation of telecommunications mergers and acquisitions has several disadvantages, competition generally benefits from the
review of these transactions by both the DOJ and
the FCC. Even though these agencies regulate
the same industry, the different characteristics of
the FCC and the DOJ allow them to oversee telecommunications competition in different ways.
Each agency brings to the table its own expertise
and perspective. The key is to figure out how to
tap into each agency's strengths without the resulting delay, uncertainty and costs that accompany the current approach.
The unique characteristics of the telecommunications industry require a specialized agency to
regulate competition. The FCC has several attributes that allow it to account for these unique characteristics in reviewing telecommunications transactions. Probably the most important asset of the
Commission for this purpose is its statutory authority under the Communications Act. Through

See, e.g., Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3.
These concerns have not gone unnoticed. For exampie, in the context of radio mergers, Senate Communications
Subcommittee Chairman Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) has commented that the FCC's review "adds unnecessary regulatory
hurdles ....
Sen. Burns Says FCCIs DuplicatingDOJAntitrust
Enforcement In Radio Sales, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 20, 1997, at 2.

He argued that "[d]uplication of [DOJ] review by the FCC
calls into question [the Commission's] allocation of limited
government resources," concluding that "the independent
and duplicative FCC evaluation of competitive impact negates the very deregulation of the radio industry that Congress intended." Id.
98 See WorldCom/MCI, supra note 22.

C.

96
97

Costs Are Significant
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its flexible "public interest" assessment under the
Communications Act, the Commission is able to
accommodate the special characteristics of the
telecommunications industry. As the Commission
stated in the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX decision, "in
evaluating whether applicants have demonstrated
that a transaction is in the public interest, we consider the transaction in light of the 'trends and
needs of the industry' as a whole, the factors that
'influenced Congress to make specific provision
for the particular industry,' and the complexity
and rapidity of change in the industry."99
Thus, the public interest test allows the Commission to consider not only whether a particular
transaction will damage competition in any market, but also all the benefits of that transaction as
well.1 00 As the court in United States v. FCC stated,
'indiscussing the Supreme Court's decision in
Denver & Rio Grande W R.R v. United States:10 1
Any contention that Clayton Act considerations must
outweigh other aspects of the public interest is belied
by the Court's statement [in Denver] that the Commission is required to "consider[ ] ...all important consequences including anticompetitive effects," . . . that the

Commission has the responsibility "to weigh anticompetitive consequences," . .. and that "the Commission
is, of course, required to consider anticompetitive issues under the public interest standard.". . . [T]he
agency is required to consider anticompetitive consequences as one part of its public interest calculus.
Neither Denver nor any other authority we have found
makes 2 the antitrust component of that analysis conclusive.

10

99 Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3, at 19988 (quoting
FCC v. RCA, 346 U.S. at 93-95, 98).
100 FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. at 98 (rejecting
theory that Clayton Act antitrust principles control antitrust
component of the public interest determination). As Judge
Posner commented, "If the Commission were enforcing the
antitrust laws, it would not be allowed to trade off a reduction
in competition .... Since it is enforcing the nebulous public

interest standard instead, it is permitted, and maybe even required, to make such a tradeoff-at least we do not understand any of the parties to question the Commission's authority to do so." Schurz Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1049
(7th Cir. 1992).
101 387 U.S. 485 (1967).
102
United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d at 87 (quoting Denver,
387 U.S. at 492, 494, 501).
103
DOJ antitrust chief Joel Klein appears to recognize
the Clayton Act's shortcomings in reviewing mergers in newly
deregulated industries. In the context of discussing mergers
between electric utilities, Klein has raised the prospect of a
moratorium on such mergers or various methods of requiring the merging parties to prove that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed by
the public interest benefits accompanying the transaction.
See Address by Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Making the Transition
from Regulation to Competition: Thinking About MergerPolicy Dur-

If the benefits sufficiently mitigate the harm,
the Commission will allow the transaction to proceed. Under the antitrust laws, however, the likelihood of substantial harm to competition in any
market, regardless of any accompanying benefits,
10 3
might lead the FCC to block the transaction.
Similarly, the Communications Act allows the
FCC to address one of the more unusual
problems of telecommunications competition10 4
obtaining access to existing infrastructure.
Conventional antitrust analysis under the Clayton
Act rarely mandates such access, ' 0 5 but the flexibility of the "public interest" test allows the Commission to take actions against bottlenecks and
other private restraints on crucial inputs that
would be unobtainable under the antitrust
laws.

06

For example, in Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, the Commission assessed whether or not the merger would
harm competition by eliminating the most significant actual and potential competitors in the New
York metropolitan market for local and long-distance service offered to residential and small business consumers. In reviewing the proposed
merger, the FCC relied on the DOJ's 1984 Merger
Guidelines, which discussed the use of the potential competition doctrine in merger review.
Under the 1984 Guidelines, the Justice Department has stated that it would be "unlikely" to challenge a merger that leaves at least three potential
ing the Process of Electric Power Restructuring, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Distinguished Speakers Series (Jan.
21, 1998) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/speeches/1332.htm>.
104
See Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FrC, Competition Policy in Communications Industries: New Antitrust Approaches, Prepared Remarks to Glasser LegalWorks Seminar
on Competitive Policy in Communications Industries (Mar.
10, 1997) <http://www.ftc.gov/ speeches/pitofsky/
newcomm.htm> [hereafter Pitofsky, New Antitrust Approaches].
105
Id. ("Antitrust rarely mandates access for several reasons: (1) if access is too easy, companies will be inclined to
lay back and take no risks on the assumption they can free
ride on the earlier investment and energy of their competitors; (2) permitting easy access for competitors can dampen
the incentives for firms to undertake risky and costly investments in the first place, unless there are countervailing firstmover advantages; and (3) it achieves little to mandate access
unless there is also provision to insure that price and other
terms and conditions of sale are "reasonable;" otherwise the
monopolist can agree to grant access but introduce terms
that are so onerous that as a practical matter is unavailable.
But regulating price and other terms of sale on a continuing
basis is exactly the thing that antitrust (as opposed to the regulatory agency with ongoing oversight of firms in the industry) is ill-equipped to manage.").
106
Id. '

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

entrants into the relevant market that are
equivalent to the merged entity. 10 7 Although the
Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger would have left several equivalent potential market entrants, the
Commission questioned the merger because real
competition had not yet occurred in local telecommunications markets. As the Commission observed, "in telecommunications markets that are
virtual monopolies or that are not yet developed ... the loss of even one significant market
participant can adversely affect the development
of competition and the attendant proposals for
deregulation."'1 0 8 The Commission also noted
that the 1984 Merger Guidelines were typically applied "to stable markets that potential entrants
have decided not to enter."10 9 By contrast, "telecommunications markets are undergoing major
change, with new entry anticipated as implementation of the 1996 Act progresses." " (
Telecommunications competition is driven
both by regulatory and technological change, factors which distinguish the industry from most
others. 1 1 ' Arguably, an expert agency such as the
FCC, which is staffed with personnel capable of
addressing many of these highly complex regulatory and technological issues, has a key role in
evaluating the public interest implications of tele11 2
communications mergers and acquisitions.
But the DOJ also brings something to the table
in reviewing telecommunications mergers and acquisitions. Through its review of such transactions, the DOJ ensures that telecommunications

108

See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3, at 20022 n.153.
Id. at 20023.
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Id.
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Id.
I"l See Pitofsky, New Antitrust Approaches, supra note
104.
112
See id.
113
Pursuant to section 7A of the Clayton Act, added by
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390, 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(1994), parties to a proposed merger or asset acquisition
must provide premerger information to the ETC and the
DOJ if the transaction and the parties exceed certain size
thresholds. The purpose of an HSR filing is to enable the
agencies to review a transaction and take any appropriate enforcement before the "eggs have been scrambled." 47 Fed.
Reg. 1662, 1939 (1982).
Pursuant to section 201 of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,
114
the DOJ and the FTC may not make public any information
filed with them "except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding." 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h).
No court has interpreted section 18a(h). Cf Lieberman v.
FTC, 771 F.2d 32, 37 n.12 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that state
attorneys general seeking HSR documents for use in state an110
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transactions have a place in the uniform body of
antitrust law. More importantly, pursuant to its
investigatory authority under the Hart-Scott
Rodino Act," 3 the DOJ has access to much more
information than the FCC in reviewing proposed
mergers and acquisitions.11 4 Accordingly, the
DOJ may consider competitive issues that the
FCC, because of the nature of its process, might
miss.
Accordingly, both agencies add something to
the telecommunications merger review process.
Nevertheless, the question remains-what
changes can be made to ensure that the disadvantages associated with this dual jurisdiction are
minimized, if not eliminated?
V. A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: DUAL
JURISDICTION SHOULD BE RETAINED,
SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION
This article proposes two alternatives which, by
making the review process more predictable and
less costly, should increase the utility of dual
agency review. Under the first model, the agencies would coordinate their review to limit the
costs to industry created by two separate agency
inquiries. The second model would involve
adopting a review approach similar to the Section
271 application process, where the FCC conducts
the agency review and the DOJ submits comments. Either of these alternatives, explained in
titrust proceedings failed to assert Section 18a(h) as grounds
for disclosure). However, the Federal Trade Commission has
construed Section 18a(h) as permitting disclosure of HSR
documents to the public to allow comment on a proposed
consent order. See In re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 58,
64 (1984). In Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, the FCC's Common Carrier Bureau ordered the parties to provide them with certain
of the HSR documents pursuant to a protective order. The
parties did not contest the order and the Commission did
not review its propriety. The portion of the Commission's
Order discussing the HSR documents was issued under seal
as a separate Appendix. See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, supra note 3,
at 20000; see also, In re Applications of Craig 0. McCaw,
Transferor, and American Telephone and Telegraph Co,
Transferee, for Consent to the Transfer of Control of McCaw
Cellular Communications, Inc. and its Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 5836, 5842-43 (1994)
[hereinafter AT&T/McCaw] (Common Carrier Bureau requested AT&T and McCaw to make HSR documents available for inspection by FCC and by commenting parties;
merging parties agreed to produce documents, but only after
FCC and commenting parties agreed to protective order governing the confidentiality of the documents), Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd. 11786 (1995).
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greater detail below, would improve the efficiency
of the dual agency review process.
A.

Formalize Cooperation

Although the agencies already have some degree of informal communication and interaction, 115 the FCC and the DOJ should expand and
formalize their cooperation, either through new
legislation or by interagency agreement.
One model for this approach is the Justice Department/FTC Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Program, or "Clearance Process," which formalizes
the DOJ and FTC merger review. Under the
Clearance Process, the DOJ and the FTC have a
nine-day window to decide which agency will review the transaction. The agencies assign the
merger review duty based on their past expertise
and experience. For example, virtually all common carrier mergers are reviewed by the DOJ because of its expertise in this area, most memorably
16
in. its successful litigation against AT&T.'
Processing of merger applications has been facilitated by innovations such as model information
request forms; internal appeals processes; "quick
look" policies, focusing agency attention on important issues; and, upon request, joint meetings
between the merging parties and the agencies to
determine which agency will evaluate the
merger.' 17 Additionally, the FTC and the Justice
Department coordinate during the thirty-day waiting period so that requests for documents or information as well as arrangements for pre-clearance meetings are made jointly."18
Another example of joint agency cooperation
that could serve as a model is the recently an115
See 47 C.F.R. § 1.1204(8) (1996) (FCC ex parte rules
permit communications between the FCC and either the
DOJ or the FTC regarding any "telecommunications competition matter" meeting certain requirements; FCC must disclose any new factual information obtained through such
communications that it relies upon in its decision).
116
Because the Clayton Act generally grants merger review authority to the FTC except to certain industries, the
Clayton Act's authorization of FCC review of common carrier

mergers at 47 U.S.C. § 21, by implication, may negate any
FTC authority to review such mergers. Although we have
been unable to find any official support for this point, we

believe that the FTC has maintained that Section 21 merely
authorizes FCC review without depriving the FTC of authority.
117 FFC and DOJ offer HSR Reg Revisions Designed to Speed
Review, Exempt Some Deals, FTC: WATCH, Mar. 27, 1995, at 2.
118 See id.

nounced "Protocol" between the FTC, the DOJ,
and the National Association of Attorneys General
that formalizes the general framework for the
conduct of joint federal/state merger investigations in order to improve cooperation and minimize the burdens on the public. 119 The Protocol
covers joint treatment of confidential information; strategic planning, document production,
and interviews with witnesses; settlement discus2
sions; and press statements.' 1'
The FCC and the DOJ could craft a review process adopting many of the approaches of the
Clearance Process and the Protocol. The easiest
change to implement would be to adopt the administrative and processing advances. This could
be achieved by interagency agreement, without
Congressional intervention to change the agencies' statutory power and authority. Another
means to facilitate document sharing is the Antitrust Civil Process Act, which permits the DOJ to
share subpoenaed documents with other government agencies, as long as those agencies are conducting ongoing proceedings and the DOJ sub1 21
mits the documents in the form of comments.
In fact, it appears that the agencies have engaged
in joint document management in the past, as in
Bell Atlantic/NYNEX when the FCC reviewed
documents obtained by the DOJ through the
Hart-Scott-Rodino procedure with the consent of
the merging parties.1 2 2 The close time between
the release dates of the DOJ and FCC items on
these mergers suggests that there may currently
be some communication between the two agencies during their merger review. These examples
suggest that the DOJ and the FCC are able to
work together in concert to review mergers.
119 See Protocol for Coordination in Merger Investigations Between the Federal Enforcement Agencies and State
Attorneys General, 4 Trad. Reg. Rep. (CCH) para. 13,420
(1998) [hereinafter "Protocol"]; FTC News Release, Federal
Antitrust Agencies and State Attorneys General Announce Protocol
for Joint Federal/State Merger Investigations (Mar. 11, 1998)
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/9803/protocol.htm>.
120
See Protocol, supra note 119.
121
See 15 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994).
122
In a related matter, in April 1996, a court ruled that
the DOJ had the legal authority to retain documents filed by
AT&T pursuant to a Motion to Vacate the Modification of
Final judgment (later declared moot) for the purpose of
sharing those documents with the FCC to the extent that
they were found relevant to proceedings under the 1996 Act.

See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1996-1 .Trade Cas. (CCH)
para. 71,364, 2 Communications Reg. 2d 1388 (P & F)
(D.D.C. 1996).
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Under the proposed model, this would increase
and be formalized.
Although it would almost certainly require Congressional action,

123

the DOJ and FCC could

agree to have only one agency perform the review. Under this approach, the DOJ and FCC
could agree to divide merger review responsibility
by the type of service which is implicated, such as
common carrier or mass media. There seems to
be some precedent for this in the DOJ/FTC context.
By implementing this proposal, the agencies
would at the very least eliminate duplicative discovery and reduce the burden on the public by
establishing jointly-developed deadlines. Under
the single agency review approach, the costs to industry would be reduced by the fact that only one
agency would be performing the review rather
than two.
B.

Section 271

A different approach would be to adapt the Section 271 approach to merger review. Briefly, Section 271 of the 1996 Act provides a mechanism by
which BOCs can enter the long distance market
in their service area by meeting a set of competitive criteria.1 24 The FCC reviews requests under
Section 271 and the DOJ submits comments that
are given "substantial weight." 125 This presents a
meaningful opportunity for the DOJ to participate in the proceedings.
This mechanism could be adapted to merger
review, where the FCC would lead the inquiry and
the DOJ would file comments on the merger. It
would consolidate decision making, allow the industry to reap the efficiency benefits of single
rather than dual agency review, and promote con123
Currently, the FCC is required to perform merger reviews under Section 214 and 310(d) of the Communications
Act. Only the DOJ may pass on a merger, taking no action.
Moreover, the FCC and the DOJ are empowered to make
slightly different inquiries.
124 See section 271 of the 1996 Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 56, 89 (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 271).
125
Id. at § 271(d) (2) (A). As the FCC commented in its
.review of Ameritech's application to provide interLATA service in Michigan, Section 271 requires that the Commission
"accord substantial weight to the Attorney General's assessment of BOC compliance with the competitive checklist and
other requirements of sections 271 and 272, as well as the
impact of such compliance on the state of.competition, in the
local exchange." In re Application of Ameritech Michigan
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sistency in merger evaluation. This would allow
the DOJ expertise to be brought to bear without
some of the disadvantages accompanying formal
dual review.
A similar approach is currently being employed
in the review process for rail mergers. With rail
mergers, dual review is conducted by the Surface
Transportation Board ("STB") and the DOJ,
where the STB has rail merger review authority
and the DOJ participates only as a commenting
party. '

26

One downside of conforming the FCC/DOJ approach to this model would be the loss of the investigative powers of the DOJ, which include the
ability to seek documents and take depositions.
Another possible problem is that the DOJ's concerns about the merger's impact on competition
may be rejected or otherwise overlooked. For example, when the DOJ vigorously opposed the
Union Pacific/Southern Pacific merger, citing
considerable competitive concerns, its complaints
fell on deaf ears at the STB, which approved the
transfer in spite of the DOJ's opposition. 127 This
suggests that, in a review process where the DOJ is
a party before another agency, the DOJ may experience considerable frustration in attempting to
influence the final outcome. On the other hand,
the DOJ's role under such a model is little different than it is under Section 7 today. The difference is that an agency, rather than a court, would
be the decision maker.
Indeed, the Justice Department resisted giving
the STB merger review authority when Congress
was considering whether the STB or the DOJ
would assume the now-defunct Interstate Commerce Commission's responsibility for rail merger
review. The Clinton administration lobbied vigorously on behalf of giving review authority to the
Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services In
Michigan, Memorandum Opinion And Order, 12 FCC Rcd.
20543, 20566 (1997).
126 See Samuel M. Sipe, Jr. & John D. Graubert, United
Railroad, Divided Views: The UP-SP Merger Leaves Shippers With
Only Two MajorRail Competitors In The West, LEGAL TIMES, Aug.

12, 1996, at S30. Note that this is the opposite of what happened with review of airline mergers, where Congress took
review power away from the Department of Transportation
and gave it to the DOJ. SeeJoan M. Feldman, U.S. Airline Concentration Burden Shifts to Justice Department, AIR TRANSPORT
WORLD,

Feb. 1989, at 34.

See Rail Deal a Little Too Generous: More Federal Vigor is
Needed to Preserve Competition, L.A. TiMES, July 15, 1996, at B4.
127
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Justice Department rather than having DOJ par1 28
ticipate as a party to a STB review proceeding.
This and DOJ's historic interest and expertise in
telecom matters suggest that the DOJ would be
unwilling to go along with a similar scenario in
the context of telecommunications mergers.
As with the first approach modeled on the
DOJ/FTC Clearance Process, the Section 271 approach would also require Congressional action.
As noted above, the agencies' statutory authority
is slightly different, and this prohibits the implementation of a Section 271 approach through interagency agreement. One variation that may
make it more palatable politically would be to allow the FCC to conduct reviews with the DOJ as a
commenting party, but leaving open the opportunity for the DOJ to initiate a separate inquiry or
bring suit if necessary under exceptional circumstances.
Although this approach appears workable,
there has been considerable criticism directed at
the Section 271 approach recently that may make
it politically difficult to implement it in the
merger context. Although these criticisms are directed at the substance of the FCC's application of
the fourteen-point Section 271 checklist (which
plays no part in the proposed merger model)
rather than the procedurewhereby the FCC reviews
mergers with comments by the DOJ (the model
proposed above), these criticisms may have
tainted the Section 271 process as a whole.
For instance, in response both to BOC
frustration over the Commission's failure to approve any
Section 271 applications thus far, as well as the recent decision by United States District Court
Judge Joe Kendall holding that Sections 271 to

bring to the local market-opening process. 3 °
These comments elicited protests from the interexchange carrier ("IXC") and CLEC corner,
where one critic suggested that such an approach
would "abdicate federal responsibility for ensur13
ing even-handed regulation of this industry." '

Regardless of the merits, it may be difficult to
champion the utility of the Section 271 approach
until the current storm has passed, despite its inherent conceptual appeal.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Michael Powell authored a white paper in which
he criticized the FCC's current approach on Section 271 applications. He characterized Judge
Kendall's decision as probably incorrect but nevertheless a "wake-up call" to the FCC regarding
the shortcomings of Section 271 and proposed a
new "collaborative approach" in which the FCC
would "partner with state commissions and the
Justice Department, respecting and, where appropriate, deferring to their judgments, according to
the unique strengths and perspectives they each

Given the number and size of mergers sweeping the communications industry, there is a growing need to examine how those transactions are
reviewed by the FCC and the DOJ. The dual jurisdiction of each agency over telecom deals imposes
significant costs on merging parties, and involves
a duplication of effort, which wastes taxpayer dollars. In many respects, the issues that both agencies evaluate when considering a merger are
largely the same, going to the merger's effect on
competition in a particular market. At the same
time, each agency has an unique expertise and
perspective involving competition policy as a fundamental Constitutional principle, having different governmental agencies involved in the same
matter is neither unusual, nor necessarily, a bad
thing. On the other hand, lack of coordination
between the two agencies and the ad hoc nature of
the merger review process suggest that steps can
be taken to minimize some of the infirmities associated with the current process, while preserving
the benefits that each agency's participation
brings to the process.
With this in mind, the agencies and Congress
might consider various approaches that preserve
each agency's role, but puts in place a more predictable, coordinated, and streamlined process.
One minimalist approach is a clearance and more
formalized coordination process between the two
agencies akin to the formal process governing
DOJ and FTC review of mergers. An alternative
approach, which would likely face stiff resistance
from the DOJ, is one where the FCC remains the
decisionmaker, and DOJ would be a commenting
party - the approach currently applicable to

See Sipe & Graubert, supra note 126.
See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp.
996, 1008 (N.D. Tex. 1997).

WK., Jan. 30,
131 Id.

275 were unconstitutional,' 129 FCC Commissioner
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Powell's Essay Sends Chilling Message, WASH.
1998, at 9.
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BOC entry into interLATA markets under Section
271 of the Communications Act, as well as involving mergers in certain other regulated industries.
At bottom, proceeding with the status quo, given
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the large stakes involved and the costs on the parties and society, the status quo makes little sense
from a communications, antitrust, or regulatory
policy perspective.

